

## HUSSERL'S 'APODICTIC EVIDENCE'

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Husserl often wrote of having achieved 'apodictic evidence' through his method of phenomenological description. This has led many of his critics to reject his work due to their rejection of any appeal to absolute evidence. Many, however, are unaware that Husserl used this phrase in a novel sense that differed from traditional appeals to apodicticity. Husserl's own senses of apodicticity (there are two, as we will see below) formed gradually as he became more and more clear about the nature of lived experience—especially as he shifted from the static descriptions of the *Logical Investigations* to the genetic descriptions of the later works. This gradual formation was brought about by what might be called hermeneutic features of the phenomenological method itself, in which the meanings of terms gradually shift due to insights achieved through careful attention to, as well as description and discussion of, experience.<sup>1</sup> One must admit that Husserl himself occasionally seems to overstate claims about apodictic evidence, due to the many shifts of sense of his terms. One may forgive the many interpreters of his work who attribute to him the very thesis he is out to supplant through careful investigation. Husserl was perhaps the most committed foundationalist in this century, but his commitment to grounding did not prevent him from following out the implications of his researches. The present essay will attempt to clarify the nature of 'apodictic evidence' in Husserl's thought, and to show how it differs from traditional views of such evidence.

In spite of changes due to greater insight as Husserl's work progressed, his phenomenological works rather consistently recognize two distinct forms of 'apodicticity' that might be called 'de facto apodicticity' and 'de jure apodicticity.'<sup>2</sup> Husserl himself did not terminologically distinguish these two forms of apodicticity in a consistent fashion, leading to problems and errors in interpreting his works (as we will see below). Most of Husserl's phenomenological claims

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and descriptions are founded upon both of these forms of apodicticity.

As working definitions of these concepts, let us say that *de facto apodicticity* is the self-givenness of lived phenomenological evidence. This evidence is intentional and horizontally embedded in the *Lebenswelt* of a transcendental ego disclosed by phenomenological reduction. *De jure apodicticity* is the result (in language) of an intersubjective critique of a linguistic formulation of essential features of evidence given with *de facto apodicticity*. This critical derivation of *de jure apodicticity* from *de facto apodicticity* is a hermeneutic process due primarily to two features of phenomenological description. First, phenomenological description, in putting lived experiences into words, must rely upon—and then transform—the meanings of terms borrowed from ordinary language.<sup>3</sup> Secondly, phenomenological investigation is intersubjective—as a phenomenologist, one must describe one's experience in language, present one's results (in language) to colleagues, who then test the description against their own experience and offer critique, which critique one must then consider as one reexamines one's own experience in light of both the original description and the criticisms of others. As Husserl notes, this process may lead the phenomenologist to correct the original description.<sup>4</sup> This lengthy language-mediated process shows that Husserl's phenomenological method in fact is a good deal more hermeneutic than many thinkers seem to recognize.<sup>5</sup> For Husserl, after all, phenomenology was neither a private insight, nor a private language, but a science—an intersubjectively controlled discipline.<sup>6</sup>

Before sketching the methodically controlled process leading from *de facto apodictic evidence* to *de jure apodictic evidence*, Husserl's two concepts of apodicticity need further clarification. Also, I will explain how they differ from the traditional concept of apodictic evidence.

In reading other philosophers' accounts of "founding evidence," Husserl noted that their accounts did not accurately reflect the actual evidence of lived experience. The theme of *de facto apodicticity* began for Husserl as early as the *Philosophie*

*der Arithmetik*, where Husserl attempted to found logic in descriptive psychology.<sup>7</sup> His recognition of his own failure to find such a foundation led him to wrestle with profound logical, metaphysical, and epistemological problems. In the *Logical Investigations*, *de facto* apodicticity founded Husserl's celebrated reply to psychologism and other forms of relativism in logic, and to rationalism and empiricism in metaphysics.<sup>8</sup> The *Ideas* develops a deepened response to the rationalistic, empiricist, and Kantian philosophies of grounding or foundation.<sup>9</sup> As Husserl's thought progressed, the nature, the power, and the limitations of evidential foundation formed the philosophical core of his researches.

'Apodictic evidence' (in his two special senses) is still for Husserl fundamental and founding; but, unlike traditional concepts of apodicticity, it is not final, absolute, or God-like.<sup>10</sup> Because absolute knowledge is rooted in the subjectivity of living consciousness (which, as Husserl shows, involves essentially a transcendental intersubjectivity<sup>11</sup>), this sense of 'absolute' must be modified significantly due to the temporal and horizontal nature of consciousness.<sup>12</sup> In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl notes the untenability of the traditional view of apodictic evidence:

The continual obstacle that may have been sensed during this exposition is owing solely to the usual, fundamentally wrong, interpretation of evidence, an interpretation made possible by the utter lack of a serious phenomenological analysis of the effective performance common to all evidence. Thus it happens that evidence is usually conceived as an *absolute apodicticity*, an absolute security against deceptions—an apodicticity quite incomprehensibly ascribed to a single mental process torn from the concrete, essentially unitary, context of subjective mental living.<sup>13</sup>

The *Ideas* speaks similarly:

Evidence is, in fact, not some sort of consciousness-index attached to a judgment (and usually one speaks of such evidence only in the case of judgment), calling to us like a mystic voice from a better world: Here is the truth;—as though such a voice would have something to say to free spirits like us and would not have to show its title to legitimacy. We no longer need to argue with skepticism, nor take into consideration objections of the old type which cannot overcome the theory of evidence which resorts to indices and feeling: whether an evil genius (the Cartesian fiction) or a fateful change in the factual course of the world could make it happen that just any false judgment would be outfitted with the index, this feeling of intellectual necessity, of the transcendent oughtness; and the like.<sup>14</sup>

Landgrebe echoes this critique in the introduction to *Experience and Judgment*, where he criticizes the traditional view of philosophers who "believed that they could measure every other item of cognition against ideal, absolute, apodictically certain knowledge,"<sup>15</sup> because of their lack of clarity concerning "the *occasioning of self-evidence*."<sup>16</sup> Here Landgrebe is calling attention to the important horizontal features of the givenness of evidence, which were completely ignored by traditional concepts of apodicticity.

Traditional concepts of apodictic evidence do not distinguish *de facto* from *de jure* apodicticity. The tradition tried to locate the "clarity and distinctness" of apodictic evidence in a single mental *act* torn from its horizontal context. Husserl, on the other hand, uses the concept of *de jure* apodicticity to apply only to the *object* of various acts that may be methodically isolated by any careful and hardworking investigator. This "clear and distinct" object is synthetic. It is an identification of the coherence or correlation between a *de*

*facto* presented piece of evidence and many other such actual and possible pieces of evidence, along with a lengthy, hermeneutic, and teleological process of inquiry. Whereas the tradition attributed incorrigibility ("security against deception") to "a single mental process torn from the concrete, essentially unitary context of subjective mental living,"<sup>17</sup> Husserl finds human certainty only in very restricted cases.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, this indubitability is not based upon a single mental act. Indubitability is founded only in the re-identifiable object of an act. This object is clearly and distinctly identified on the basis of a long, painstaking critique of cognition that, while founded *de facto* in the individual acts of cognition, is founded *de jure* in a recursive process of introspection, conceptualization, dialogue, and critical re-examination. This process includes a genetic unfolding and synthetic overreaching of many acts of consciousness to isolate clearly their self-identical object. This process yields a *de jure* apodicticity that, while not completely incorrigible, is nonetheless free from skeptical doubts due in large part to the intersubjective nature of phenomenological investigation, which tests and re-tests the results of individual acts of intuition. Here we have nothing like the Cartesian solipsism that grounded the isolated *cogito* but was unable to ground the rest of the world.

One should not see the hermeneutic elements of the phenomenological criticism of the tradition as leading to skepticism. Husserl held that there are indeed cases of knowledge where doubt is inadmissible:

In individual cases the flux of sense-experience, or also of specific mental experiences, may very well leave room for doubt: this is not possible in all cases. Where differences are gross, a self-evidence is attainable which renders all doubt unjustifiable.<sup>19</sup>

The phenomenological reply to the skeptic is to grant that there are doubtful claims and experiences in life, but to deny that these are a sufficient basis for a whole-cloth rejection of clear

and certain (*de facto* and *de jure* founded) knowledge.

Husserl's account of the interplay between *de jure* and *de facto* apodicticity will now be traced in two of his works, the *Cartesian Meditations* and *The Idea of Phenomenology*.

Husserl addresses the judgmental (and thus linguistic) form of grounding at *Cartesian Meditations* §4:

In a genuine grounding, judgments show themselves as "correct," as "agreeing"; that is to say, the grounding is an *agreement* of the judgment with the judged state of affairs [*Urteilsverhalt*] (the affair {*Sache*} or affair-complex [*Sachverhalt*]) "itself."<sup>20</sup>

Here *de facto* apodicticity is present in the way the evidence "shows itself." *De jure* apodicticity is present in the comparative (and horizontally embedded) "showing as" or "agreeing of" evidence.

Founding evidence is not given all at once but is instead a synthetic tying together of a long process of investigation. In this process there is, according to Husserl, a hermeneutic relation between the pre-predicative layers of experience and the predicative nature of phenomenological descriptions:

Predicative includes pre-predicative evidence. That which is meant or, perchance, evidently viewed receives predicative expression; and science always intends to judge expressly and keep the judgment of the truth fixed, as an express judgment or as an express truth. But the expression as such has its own comparatively good or bad way of fitting what is meant or itself given; and therefore it has its own evidence or non-evidence, which also goes into the predicating. Consequently evidence of the expression is also a determining part of the idea of scientific truth, as predicative complexes that are, or can be, grounded absolutely.<sup>21</sup>

Thus a primary hermeneutic element of phenomenological description is the fitting of terms, borrowed from ordinary language, to the experiential features uncovered by phenomenological reduction. The linguistic expression may fit the *de facto* experiential grounding more or less adequately. As evidenced in the vast phenomenological literature, this process involves the use of many neologisms (such as Husserl's 'protention' and 'retention') and metaphors, which are required because phenomenologically disclosed features of experience differ in important respects from prescientific uses of language.

*De jure* apodictic evidence is teleological. It is horizontally embedded in the project of the living researcher. The horizons of time, intersubjectivity, the nature of the scientific project, etc., all embed the appearance of any particular evidence in a complex and synthetic whole that is essentially open-ended:

*Perfect evidence and its correlate, pure and genuine truth, are given as ideas lodged in the striving for knowledge, for fulfillment of one's meaning intention. By immersing ourselves in such a striving, we can extract those ideas from it. Truth and falsity, criticism and critical comparison with evident data, are an everyday theme, playing their incessant part even in prescientific life. For this everyday life, with its changing and relative purposes, relative evidences and truths suffice. But science looks for truths that are valid, and remain so, once for all and for everyone; accordingly it seeks verifications of a new kind, verifications carried through to the end. Though de facto, as science itself must ultimately see, it does not attain actualization of a system of absolute truth, but rather is obliged to modify its "truths" again and again, it nevertheless follows the idea of absolute or scientifically genuine truth; and accordingly it reconciles itself to an infinite*

horizon of approximations, tending toward that idea.<sup>22</sup>

The teleological nature of *de jure* apodictic evidence makes it corrigible and subject to possible future criticism. Thus, the highest form of evidence attainable is not God-like or absolute, although it is as "absolutely certain" as humans can attain, and is sufficient to withstand the assaults of the skeptics.

Husserl was well aware of the problems arising from the philosopher's need to borrow terminology from ordinary language and to control carefully the many necessary shifts of meaning that philosophy requires:

Because the sciences aim at predications that express completely and with evident fitness what is beheld pre-predicatively, it is obvious that I must be careful also about this aspect of scientific evidence. Owing to the instability and ambiguity of common language and its much too great complacency about completeness of expression, we require, even where we use its means of expression, a new legitimation of significations by orienting them according to accrued insights, and a fixing of words as expressing the significations thus legitimated. That too we account as part of our normative principle of evidence, which we shall apply consistently from now on.<sup>23</sup>

Husserl characterizes more fully the ideal of (*de jure*) apodictic evidence at *Cartesian Meditations* §6, where he stresses the corrigibility of the (hermeneutic) process that strives for such evidence.<sup>24</sup> The first paragraph of §6 notes that the evidence "of prescientific experiences" (which I would call *de facto* apodictic evidence) may be incomplete or unfulfilled, or fulfilled. This level of "givenness" is characterized by David Carr as "the basic instance of self-evidence or fulfillment par excellence beyond which we cannot and need

not go."<sup>25</sup>

In the second paragraph, Husserl introduces the notion of apodicticity as "*absolute indubitability* in a quite definite and peculiar sense."<sup>26</sup> I interpret this to be *de jure* apodicticity. In the third paragraph, Husserl contrasts "any evidence" (which he says is "a grasping of something itself," that is, *de facto* apodicticity) with "*apodictic* evidence,"<sup>27</sup> (which I interpret as *de jure* apodicticity). *De jure* apodicticity differs from *de facto* apodicticity because of the former's basis in *critical reflection*:

An *apodictic* evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity of being *at the same time the absolute unimagineness* (inconceivability) of their *non-being*, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as "objectless," empty. Furthermore the evidence of that critical reflection likewise has the dignity of being apodictic, as does therefore the evidence of the unimagineness of what is presented with <apodictically> evident certainty. And the same is true of every critical reflection at a higher level.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, *de jure* apodictic evidence is revealed in its fullness only to critical reflection. Through a controlled process of reflective synthesis ranging over acts of given (*de facto*) evidence, linguistic representation of such evidence, and intersubjective critique of the linguistic representation, this critical reflection reveals the full or pregnant sense of evidence: certainty. This certainty is, to be sure, human and not God-like: we have seen that the highest certainty available is still not completely incorrigible. It is nonetheless sufficient to banish skeptical doubts about the possibility of grounded knowledge.

In *The Idea of Phenomenology*, one may also find *de jure*

and *de facto* apodictic evidence. In saying that, "The *cogitationes* are the first absolute data,"<sup>29</sup> Husserl seems to be pointing to the fact that the path to *de jure* apodicticity begins with evidence presented in *de facto* apodicticity. The role of critique in the examination of *de facto* lived experience is also stressed, in fact it is identified with phenomenological method: "The *method* of the critique of cognition is the phenomenological method."<sup>30</sup>

Phenomenology does not, as many of its detractors seem to misinterpret it, exhaust its method with the mere grasp of mental processes (as reduced to intentional structures of the *Lebenswelt* by phenomenological reduction). "Critique of cognition" (*Erkenntniskritik*) involves much more than describing a momentary "slice" of consciousness.<sup>31</sup> The critique of consciousness is a method. It includes planning, investigation, and language. Its goal is *de jure* apodictic evidence, intersubjectively acquired.

A perception (or a memory, an imagination, etc.), presented in *de facto* apodicticity, may be examined, with a view toward *de jure* apodicticity:

I can, however, have an actual perception and inspect it. I can, moreover, represent to myself in imagination or memory a perception and survey it as so given to imagination. In that case I am no longer vacuously talking about perception or having a vague intension or idea of it. Instead, perception itself stands open to my inspection as actually or imaginatively given to me. And the same is true of every intellectual process, of every form of thinking and cognizing.<sup>32</sup>

*De jure* apodictic evidence is subject to intersubjective control. As such, the "private" experience of the phenomenologist must be put into a "public"<sup>33</sup> language:

We inspect [mental processes—*Erlebnisse*], and while inspecting them we can observe their

essence, their constitution, their intrinsic character, and we can make our speech conform in a pure measure to what is "seen" in its full clarity.<sup>34</sup>

The propositional structure of judgment is essential to a critique of cognition:

... the possibility of a critique of cognition depends on the demonstration of absolute data which are different from even the reduced *cogitationes*. To view the matter more precisely, in the subject-predicate judgments which we make concerning them, we have already gone beyond them. If we say: this phenomenon of judgment underlies this or that phenomenon of imagination, this perceptual phenomenon contains this or that aspect, color content, etc., and even if, just for the sake of argument, we make these assertions in the most exact conformity with the givenness of the *cogitatio*, then the logical forms which we employ, and which are reflected in the linguistic expressions themselves, already go beyond the mere *cogitationes*. A "something more" is involved which does not at all consist of a mere agglomeration of new *cogitationes*, which are joined to those concerning which we made the assertions, nevertheless they are not what constitute the predicational facts which are the objective correlates of the assertions.

That cognition, which can bring to *absolute self-givenness* not only particulars, but also *universals, universal objects, and universal states of affairs*, is more easily conceivable, at least for anyone who can assume the position of pure "seeing" and can hold all natural prejudices at arm's length. This cognition is of decisive significance for the possibility of phenomenology.

For its special character consists in the fact that it is the analysis of essence and the investigation into essence in the area of pure "seeing" thought and absolute self-givenness.<sup>35</sup>

Phenomenological method thus subjects *de facto* evidence to a hermeneutic process of conceptual critique, in order to arrive at *de jure* apodicticity:

And in general it is not primarily a matter of clinging to certain selected appearances as data, but rather of getting insight into the nature of givenness and of the self-constitution of different modes of objectivity.<sup>36</sup>

The "insight" here is achieved only through an arduous, intersubjective process involving careful focus upon *de facto* apodictically given experience, linguistic representation of the experience, presentations of one's formulation to one's philosophical peers, and the intersubjective dialectic of critique. This dialectic leads to a hermeneutic re-evaluation of one's experience, of the concepts used to describe it, and of the nature of philosophical problems, methods, and discourse.

Maurice Natanson recognizes the complexity of phenomenological investigation: "Phenomenological certitude rests not only on the in-person givenness of intentional objects but on the manner in which that givenness has been secured."<sup>37</sup> Husserl describes phenomenological investigation as a critique of cognition, which is based in intuition, conceptual clarification, critical (intersubjective) discourse, and a synthetic grasping of the self-identical objects of various related conscious acts. *De jure* apodictic evidence does not occur fortuitously or "in a flash," but only as the result of a careful, self-critical and methodologically controlled search. *De jure* apodictic evidence results in a grounded judgment whose grounds stem from the nature of phenomenological investigation itself.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>I have established this in *The Theory and Practice of Husserl's Phenomenology* (New York: UP of America, 1986), ch. 7; *Language and Experience: Descriptions of Living Language in Husserl and Wittgenstein* (New York: UP of America, 1984), ch. 3, §§17-18; "A Phenomenological Account of the Linguistic Mediation of the Public and the Private," *Husserl Studies* 1 (1984): 263-80; and "Language and the Phenomenological Reduction: A Reply to a Wittgensteinian Objection," *Man and the World* 12 (1979): 35-46. The present essay is a revision of a longer paper entitled "Hermeneutics and Apodicticity in Phenomenological Method" that was presented to the Husserl Circle and that will appear in *Southwest Philosophy Review*.

<sup>2</sup>I am indebted for the application of the terms *de jure* and *de facto* to Husserl's thought to José Huertas-Jourda, "On the Two Foundations of Knowledge According to Husserl," in *Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch: 1983*, ed. Lester Embree, Current Continental Research 007 (Washington: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology; UP of America, 1984) 195-211. By tying these terms to Husserl's sense of 'apodicticity,' I hope to further the research begun by Huertas-Jourda, who noted that Husserl's descriptions of *de facto* epistemological foundation "are founded in the legitimizing ground of transcendental subjectivity and derive their right from the apodicticity of the transcendental ego . . ." (199). On the distinction between these forms of apodicticity, see Bernard P. Dauenhauer, "Husserl's Phenomenological Justification of Universal Rigorous Science," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 16 (1976): 63-80, especially 72-74.

<sup>3</sup>Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1970) 210; hereafter cited as "K." I will provide reference to the *Husserliana* series of the German

editions of Husserl's works as "Hua." followed by volume and page number. The reference for the present citation is (Hua. VI: 214).

<sup>4</sup>Edmund Husserl, *Introduction to the Logical Investigations*, trans. P. J. Bossert and C. H. Peters, ed. Eugen Fink (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975) 60.

<sup>5</sup>See Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1977) 316; and Paul Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," in *Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. Don Ihde, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1974) 3-24. In the latter, Ricoeur expresses the need to "graft the hermeneutic problem onto the phenomenological method" (3). The present essay exhibits evidence to support the claim that Husserl's method is less in need of such a graft than Ricoeur (and others) seem to recognize.

<sup>6</sup>Pace Suzane Cunningham, *Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl*, *Phaenomenologica* 70 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976).

<sup>7</sup>*Philosophie der Arithmetik: psychologische und logische Untersuchungen*, Band 1 (Halle-Salle: Robert Stricker, 1891). Only the first volume was published.

<sup>8</sup>Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols., trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), Introduction to Vol. 2, §§2, 7. (Hua. XIX/1). Hereafter cited as "LI."

<sup>9</sup>*Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book; General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Fred Kersten, Edmund Husserl

Collected Works 2 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982). Hereafter cited as "*Ideas* (Hua. III/1)."

<sup>10</sup>Maurice Natanson expresses this as follows: "Husserl's position amounts to this: certainty is rooted in subjectivity and subjectivity is the locus of absolute knowledge" (*Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks*, Northwestern Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy [Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973] 161).

<sup>11</sup>Edmund Husserl, *The Paris Lectures*, trans. P. Koestenbaum (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) 12, 32-36 (Hua. I: 12, 32-36); hereafter cited as "PL." See also: Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970) 130 (Hua. I: 158), hereafter cited as "CM"; Edmund Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969) 236-41 (Hua. XVII: 243-48), hereafter cited as "FTL"; and K 252-65 (Hua. VI: 256-60).

<sup>12</sup>For example, see: *Ideas* §§27-28; CM §19; K §§47, 49; Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, ed. Ludwig Langrebe, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973) §§8-9, hereafter cited as "EJ"; and Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, trans. J[ames] S. Churchill, ed. Martin Heidegger (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964) (Hua. X). For the German edition of EJ, see *Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik* (Hamburg: Claassen & Govers, 1948).

<sup>13</sup>FTL §59, 156-57 (Hua. XVII: 165).

<sup>14</sup>*Ideas* 345 (Hua. III/1: 334). The context and content of this quotation justify interpreting his remarks on 'evidence' here as comments on a tradition of 'apodictic evidence.' David Carr traces this notion of apodicticity to Kant, and notes how an analysis of the very concepts surrounding the issue of "the

structure of cognition and experience" (21) will naturally "lead in a relativistic direction" (20), since such analysis will "[render] relativism plausible" (21, my brackets) ("Phenomenology and Relativism," in *Phenomenology in Practice and Theory*, ed. W. S. Hamrick, *Phaenomenologica* 92 [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1985] 19-34). My focus upon *de jure* apodicticity attempts to show how transcendental phenomenology may perform such analyses without being forced into relativism.

<sup>15</sup>EJ §3, 18 (German ed. §3, 10).

<sup>16</sup>EJ §3, 10. This is the *de facto* epistemological foundation described by Huertas-Jourda in "Two Foundations."

<sup>17</sup>FTL §59, 156-57 (Hua. XVII: 165), italics added.

<sup>18</sup>"Where differences are gross, a self-evidence is attainable which renders all doubt unjustifiable." LI, Second Investigation, §39, 419 (Hua. XIX/1: 210), italics added.

<sup>19</sup>LI, Second Investigation, §39, 419 (Hua. XIX/1: 210).

<sup>20</sup>CM §4, 10 (Hua. I: 51). The square brackets are from the English translation, and the braces are my addition. Cf. LI, Investigation VI, §§38-39, where Husserl notes that there are "degrees and levels of self-evidence" ("*Graden und Stufen der Evidenz*") (2: 765; Hua. XIX/2: 651) and that the adequate perception of truth requires both self-giveness of an intentional object and an "act of objectifying interpretation" ("*Akt objektivierender Auffassung*") (2: 766; Hua. XIX/2: 652). Cf. Richard Cobb-Stevens, who states, "Thus, all experience is both intuition and interpretation" ("*Hermeneutics without Relativism: Husserl's Theory of Mind*," in *Husserl and Contemporary Thought*, ed. John Sallis [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities P, 1983] 127-48, quotation from 145).

<sup>21</sup>CM §4, 11 (Hua. I: 52).

