

ANDREW C. WARD

Pragmatism and Epistemic Truth

Epistemology has long been dominated by the attempt to uncover the "correct account" of epistemic justification. As Alvin Plantinga writes, "[I]t would be a colossal understatement to say that Anglo-American epistemology of this century has made much of the notion of *epistemic justification*" (Plantinga 1990, 45).¹ The reason for this recurring interest is the feeling that something essential is lacking in all the proffered accounts of epistemic justification.² No matter which proposed account is adopted,³ there are counter-arguments claiming to demonstrate that satisfying the criteria offered by the account will not guarantee the goal of "maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of beliefs" (Alston 1989, 83).⁴ This last point is especially important. The predominant view in the Western Philosophical tradition has been that truth is separate from, and ultimately the goal of epistemic justification. Thus, the reason why we should care about uncovering the proper account of epistemic justification is that it will give us criteria that, when satisfied, will enable us to pick out which of our beliefs are true (see Bonjour 1985, 6-8).⁵ As Jonathan Kvanvig (1998) writes, "[T]he position that [epistemic] justification is valuable independently of the importance or value of truth ought to strike us as an utterly mysterious one. It is akin to developing statistical categories in baseball that will have nothing to do with winning baseball games" (432).

Understood in these terms, the real problem concerns what Laurence Bonjour (1985) calls "the metajustification" of the proposed accounts of epistemic justification (9; Rescher 1980, 13-14, makes a similar claim). This metajustification aims at showing that the proposed criteria for epistemic justification are adequately truth-conducive (see Bonjour 1985, 8). Such a metajustification would, Bonjour writes, constitute, in Feigl's useful sense, a *vindication* of the proposed standards of epistemic justification: it would show that adopting those standards is a reasonable means for reaching "truth" (9).⁶ Without such a metajustification, the choice of criteria deemed sufficient for a belief's being epistemically justified seems arbitrary. But now we have come to the crux of the epistemologist's problem. One epistemologist offers a set of criteria whose satisfaction is claimed to be singularly necessary and jointly sufficient for a belief's being true. A critic then purports to show that the proffered criteria are inadequate because they fail the requirement of metajustification – that is, they are shown to be inadequately truth-conducive.⁷ Why though, should we accept the standards of metajustification used by the critic? It is only if these standards are accepted that the critic can legitimately claim that the proffered criteria for epistemic justification are inadequate.

Here we come up against what Roderick Chisholm, following earlier writers such as Sextus Empiricus, calls "the problem of the criterion" (Chisholm 1977, ch. 7; 1982, ch. 5; Rescher 1980, ch. 1; Sextus Empiricus 1933, bk. 2, chs. 4, 20; bk. 1, chs. 114-17; see also Popkin 1979, ch. 1). In contexts in which what we are interested

in is an adequate understanding of knowledge, the problem, writes Chisholm, arises when we ask two very general questions: First, what are the *criteria* of our knowledge, and second, what is the *extent* of our knowledge (Chisholm 1977, 120; also see 1982, 65; and Rescher 1980, ch. 1)? Relative to the relationship between epistemic criteria and truth, the problem of the criterion plays itself out into the following dilemma. If we can specify metajustificatory criteria whose satisfaction ensures that proposed epistemic criteria are singularly necessary and jointly sufficient for a belief's being true, then we will have a way of deciding whether we have maximized truth and minimized falsity in a large body of beliefs. Alternatively, if we know the extent of our true beliefs, then we can work backwards and use this as the metajustificatory mark of whether the proposed epistemic criteria are adequately truth-conducive. However, as is the case when the dilemma is posed in terms of singularly necessary and jointly sufficient criteria for knowledge, "if we do not have the answer to the first question, then, it would seem, we have no way of answering the second. And if we do not have the answer to the second, then, it would seem, we have no way of answering the first" (Chisholm 1977, 120; see also 1982, 65-66).

There have been many attempts to answer this dilemma.⁸ For instance, Chisholm's answer (1977) to the dilemma with respect to knowledge is to adopt a kind of "common-sensism" according to which criteria of knowing are accommodated to "prior assumptions about what it is that we do know" (121). On such an account, at least part of the metajustification for proffered epistemic criteria is that they accord with those prior assumptions about what we know. Still, whether focused on the case of knowledge (as in Chisholm) or on the relationship between epistemic justification and truth, at the heart of the dilemma is the *separation* of epistemic justification and truth (see Williams 1988, 430-31). Once the separation of epistemic justification from truth is made, the resulting "epistemological gap" (see Fine 1984, 54) seems inevitably to lead to "the problem of the criterion", and in so doing, raise the specter of scepticism.⁹ Thus, one response to the dilemma is to de-solve it rather than solve it. One way to dis-solve the dilemma involves retaining the notion that truth is a property,¹⁰ but adopting what has come to be called an epistemic concept of truth in which the distinction between truth and epistemic justification is collapsed. Although in one form or another this has had some notable contemporary exponents, epistemic concepts of truth have generally not been well received.¹¹ In what follows I will look at several of the most significant problems with "epistemic truth" and argue that such problems can be answered by adopting a view of epistemic truth as pragmatist truth.

To begin with, collapsing the distinction between epistemic justification and truth seems patently Draconian.¹² If epistemic justification is "one and the same thing" as truth, then it seems, as Paul Moser (1985) writes, that this:

... rules out the justification of all false propositions, regardless of how much evidence they enjoy. This view implies, for instance, that astronomers working in the Ptolemaic

tradition before Copernicus were not, and in fact could not be, justified in believing the distinctive false propositions of their theory. And this implication seems especially implausible when we consider the fact that the Copernican theory was based on the same kind of evidence as was the Ptolemaic theory: the recorded positions of the sun, the moon, and the planets on the celestial sphere at different times. (7.)

What Moser is getting at is the concern that if epistemic justification and truth are one and the same, then only true propositions are epistemically justified. At the very least, this seems to entail two counterintuitive consequences. First, if distinguishing epistemic justification from truth is a necessary condition for the possibility of mistaken beliefs, then equating the two precludes the possibility of mistaken beliefs. For example, equating truth and epistemic justification seems to entail that neither the claims of the Ptolemaic view nor the claims of the Copernican view concerning the relative positions of the sun, moon and planets are mistaken. On the seemingly non-controversial assumption that a number of Ptolemaic claims are inconsistent with Copernican claims, it is difficult to understand how no members of either set of claims could be mistaken. Expanding on this last point, precluding the possibility of mistaken beliefs seems to imply that "two incompatible ... beliefs can be equally epistemically justified" (Lynch 1998, 104). But if two incompatible beliefs can both be epistemically justified, then, if truth and epistemic justification are "one and the same", it follows that both beliefs are true. If both beliefs are true though, then they are not really incompatible. Thus, we seem left with the implausible conclusion that the belief that the sun revolves around the earth and the belief that the earth revolves around the sun are not incompatible. On top of this, if the "rules we follow for finding the truth ... constitute the truth itself" (Moser, Mulder and Trout 1998, 64), then a second counterintuitive consequence is that the truth-value of a belief may change when what counts as epistemic justification changes. For example, the belief that the sun revolves around the earth may be true using Ptolemaic justificatory criteria, but false using Copernican justificatory criteria. This seems to imply an unpalatable relativism about the world that runs counter to the common-sense notion that "truth is unchanging, while the epistemic status of a belief ... may change positively or negatively as new information comes in" (Lynch 1998, 104).¹³ As William Alston (1996) writes, the "epistemic value of a belief varies over different epistemic situations. But truth-value does not vary in this way. A belief (i.e., a belief of content) is true or false once for all; it does not alter its truth-value through time or across the population. If it is true that gold is malleable, it is true for everyone and at every time" (192).

What is common to these objections is the belief that the notion of truth as epistemic justification is really no notion of truth at all (see Kitcher 1991, 676).¹⁴ What lies behind such a claim is what has come to be called the "Modernist" view that truth, however it is to be finally accounted for, is some sort of timeless, unchanging ideal against which we must judge our endeavors. Truth, on this account, is, as James (1991) says, that goal of inquiry which "no farther experience will ever alter"; it is the "ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine that all our

temporary truths will some day converge" (98).¹⁵ It is precisely at this point that the pragmatist, in his or her rejection of Modernism, has something important to say. For the pragmatist there are at least two different senses in which "truth" can be the goal of inquiry; senses that, for the pragmatist, are conflated in the objections to epistemic truth presented above.

First, there is the concept of truth that makes a difference in "common life" as the concrete, historically situated settlement of opinion, and as a stable relief from doubt.¹⁶ So understood, truth as the goal of inquiry is, as James rightly observed, conditional (James 1991, 28 ff., 101-2). When a belief is conditionally true, it is a belief, sanctioned by situated (local) social practices, that is successful in resolving challenges to claims that we would be epistemically irresponsible in holding the belief. It does not follow from this that the success in question is gauged by the satisfaction of a single individual's "epistemic doubt". Although "[S]atisfaction *per se*" is, James (1997) writes, "a subjective condition" (190), the assessment of success is social.¹⁷ The obvious analogy here is to the successful use of a word within a language. While an individual may be satisfied that he or she has used the word properly, such satisfaction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the word having really been used successfully. Success, unlike satisfaction *simpliciter*, demands a social context. As Catherine Elgin (1999) writes, "[I]ndividual methods, inferences, conclusions and the like, are justified by the standards of the practices to which they belong, by rules they recognize as binding on them" (99). It is because situated social practices change, and with them what counts as successful practices, that this concept of truth is conditional.¹⁸

The second concept of truth is what James (1991) calls "Truth with a big T" (102, 106-107). It is "Truth with a big T", hereafter referred to as "absolutist truth", that James has in mind when writing of inquiry's goal as the "ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge ... which no farther experience will ever alter" (98). In this respect, absolutist truth is the *telos* for conditional truth. Because this goal is an idealization, its function is, to use Kant's language, regulative as opposed to constitutive (see Fine 1984, 55).¹⁹ Absolutist truth is the "final" regulative epistemic ideal, unassailable by doubt (see Pierce 1955[1905], 257), to which all particular claims of epistemic justification aspire (Putnam 1996, 107). Although absolutist truth does not enter directly into the assessment of situated social practices, it does provide their grounding, as well as an important impetus for continuing reflexive assessment.²⁰

Once the distinction between conditional and absolutist truth is made, the objection that only true beliefs are epistemically justified can be resolved. The belief that the sun revolves around the earth is true, conditionally, when situated within the Ptolemaic system. The belief that the earth revolves around the sun is true, conditionally, when situated with the Copernican system. This is what James (1991) meant when he wrote:

...we have to live today by what truth we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call it falsehood. Ptolemaic astronomy, Euclidean space, Aristotelian logic, scholastic metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has boiled over those limits, and we now call those things only relatively true, or true within those borders of experience. (98.)

However, it does not follow from this context specification that true and false beliefs cannot be distinguished. Once a specification of epistemic justificatory practice is made, it is often straightforward, depending upon the context, to distinguish true from false beliefs. For instance, suppose I see it raining outside and hear the rain falling on the roof. In most familiar situations my belief that it is raining is epistemically justified, and so is conditionally true. Naturally this does not mean that we ought to abandon caution in claiming that our current beliefs are conditionally true. Like Peirce, we are well advised to be fallibilists when it comes to accepting the beliefs we hold as true as well as which epistemic justificatory practices we accept. However, when the point is reached where the accepted justificatory practices successfully answer the inquiry, there is no point in continuing the inquiry unless challenged at some later date. "When doubt ceases," writes Peirce (1955[1877]), "mental action on the subject comes to an end; and if it did go on, it would be without a purpose" (11).²¹

It must be admitted that from the "perspective" of absolutist truth very little of what we believe to be the case may in fact be so.²² Such is the view of the metaphysical realist with respect to truth. The metaphysical realist tries to stand outside all the various situated epistemic practices and judge them as more or less adequate from this external point of view (see Fine 1988, 1201). This position tempts adoption of skepticism precisely because of its insistence that absolutist truth is the only truth there is. However, as James (1997) continually and consistently insisted, "this is what the pragmatist denies" (see, e.g., 274). For the pragmatist, epistemology is best thought of as a bricolage in which conditional truths, as epistemic justifications, are "challenge and doubt eradicating" negotiations and renegotiations within the natural and social worlds.

Not only does the identification of truth and pragmatic epistemic justification permit one to distinguish true and false beliefs, it also permits the possibility of mistaken beliefs. Specifically, a belief may be mistaken in at least one of four ways. First, a person could hold a belief to be true because she or he is satisfied that the belief is true—in effect, that the belief satisfies an epistemic "irritation" for the inquirer. However, if such satisfaction is not supported by the epistemic justificatory practices within which the belief is held to be true, then the person is mistaken in holding the belief to be true. This reflects the difference between satisfaction and success with respect to conditional truth. Second, a belief may be supported by one epistemic justificatory practice but not by another. In such a case, holding the belief is, from the perspective of the second epistemic justificatory practice, mistaken. Here one, though not the only possibility is that members of the two practices will engage

one another in such a way that an enlarged practice emerges that supersedes both of the earlier practices (see MacIntyre 1977, 455ff).²³ If, according to this new practice, epistemically justified beliefs emerge that would not have been sanctioned by either of the superseded practices, then participants of the earlier two practices would have been mistaken in not holding those beliefs. Third, within a "single" set of epistemic justificatory practices, a belief may be conditionally true according to some of the embedded practices but mistaken according to others. Unlike the absolutist, the pragmatist does not idealize sets of epistemic justificatory practices as having to be unitary and consistent. Tensions within sets of accepted epistemic justificatory practices quite often lead to changes in the practices, though there is no *a priori* way to predict how the tensions will be resolved, if resolved at all. Fourth, recalling that the concept of truth embodied in situated epistemic justificatory practices is conditional, there is always the possibility that someone will conflate conditional truth with absolutist truth. In such cases, mistakes can be said to occur in supposing that a belief held conditionally true is also true absolutely.²⁴ The upshot is that far from mistakes being precluded by identifying truth and epistemic justification, several different kinds of mistakes can and often do occur. For the pragmatist, the notion of mistake is multi-faceted, not univocal.

Finally, the identification of truth with epistemic justification does entail that the truth-value of a belief may change with changes in epistemic justificatory practices. This is part and parcel with the distinction between conditional and absolutist truth drawn by the pragmatist. A belief is never true *simpliciter*; it is conditionally true, if true at all, within the context of situated epistemic justificatory practices. Moreover, many times beliefs will be neither entirely justified nor entirely unjustified by epistemic justificatory practices. Epistemic justification is sometimes a matter of degree, and cases in which a belief will be absolutely justified by an epistemic practice will, in the context of some practices, be the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, this still permits the possibility of "stabilized beliefs" (see Longino 1994, 141 ff.) and does not lead to some sort of "anything goes" relativism. Justificatory practices are constrained both by the social contexts in which the practices are recognized and validated, and by the natural world. This latter is especially important. The pragmatist is not denying that there is an objective world. Instead the pragmatist is denying that our beliefs, when (conditionally) true, somehow picture that world.

Of course there are other important concerns that deserve careful examination. For instance, is the pragmatist account of truth as epistemic justification in need some sort of metajustification?²⁵ While not underestimating this and other concerns, what I hope to have done is suggest that the pragmatically understood epistemic conception of truth is not so implausible as has sometimes been contended.

1. Also see Chisholm (1977), who writes that "[T]he theory of knowledge could be said to have as its subject matter the justification of belief, or, more exactly, the justification of believing" (5), and Kirkham (1997), who writes that "it is the primary task of epistemology to discover whether our beliefs can be justified and, if so, how" (42). In their recent introduction to epistemology, Pollock and Cruz (1999) write that "epistemology has traditionally focused on epistemic justification more than on knowledge. Epistemology might better be called 'doxastology', which means the study of beliefs" (11). The issue of epistemic justification is certainly not limited to the 20th century. As Popkin (1979) points out, "[W]ith the rediscovery in the sixteenth century of writings of the Greek Pyrrhonist, Sextus Empiricus, the arguments and views of the Greek sceptics became part of the philosophical core of the religious struggles then taking place" (1).
2. The question to what extent this "feeling of inadequacy" is "natural or intuitive", and to what extent it is "the product of contentious and possibly dispensable theoretical preconceptions" (Williams 1996, 1) is an important one.
3. There have been many. For a survey of various kinds of justification as they relate to foundationalism, see Triplett 1990.
4. Put differently, "our central cognitive aim is to amass a large body of beliefs with a favorable truth-falsity ratio" (Alston 1989, 84). As Timmons (1996) rightly points out, "it is probably too simplistic to suppose that there is a single epistemic goal – having true beliefs and avoiding false ones" (321 n. 25). Nevertheless, a favorable truth-falsity ratio does seem to be one of the most important epistemic goals for traditional epistemology.
5. As Rorty (1995) writes, "Philosophers who discuss truth have often hoped to underwrite our assumption that the more justification we offer of a belief, the likelier it is that that belief is true" (284-85). What lies behind this is the assumption that the subject of belief is separate from the objects of belief, and that a necessary condition for knowledge is that this separation be bridged. As Dewey (1991) writes, the traditional questions of epistemology

...all spring from the assumption of a merely beholding mind on one side and a foreign and remote object to be viewed and noted on the other. They ask how a mind and world, subject and object, so separate and independent can by any possibility come into such relationship to each other as to make true knowledge possible. (150.)
6. Bonjour ties the requirement to metajustification to internalism. This is a connection about which I intend in this paper to be agnostic.
7. As Harman (1973), p. 112, writes:

...one response to skepticism assumes the validity of certain principles of justification and then tries to use those principles to refute the skeptic by arguing that we are justified in believing many of the things we ordinarily suppose we know. The major problem with any response is that it merely transfers the skeptical challenge to the assumed principles of justification. (112.)

Paraphrasing Montaigne's formulation of the issue in his *Essays*, Chisholm (1982) writes:

To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we need to have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedures [sic] is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. (62.)
8. If one accepts skepticism as an option, this is a trilemma. See Chisholm 1982, 66, for his characterization of the skeptical alternative. Rescher (1980), focusing on how the criteria are justified, writes that "[T]he short answer is that they are ultimately validated not in advance, but only ex post facto,

- through the results of their applications: By their fruits shall ye know them" (14). In other words, justification is pragmatist.
9. Williams (1988) makes the astute observation that, strictly, "[I]t is not the logical gap alone that threatens us with scepticism but the thought that, pending heroic efforts, we are stuck on one side of it" (432).
 10. Another way to dis-solve the dilemma would be to opt for a deflationist account of truth. A deflationist account of truth is not deflationist. As Kirkham (1997) writes, it is "self-contradictory" to suppose that a deflationist account of truth would identify truth with an epistemic property (329). If "truth is not a property at all, then it is certainly not an epistemic property." Because of space constraints, I do not examine this strategy in this paper.
 11. Moser, Mulder, and Trout (1998) express well the prevailing opinion about epistemic accounts of truth when they write:

We have little, if any, reason to collapse the distinction between the standards for discerning what statements are true and the defining standards for what it is for a statement to be true. The distinction is clearly intelligible and very useful. It is akin to the distinction between how things seem to one (identifying standards for truth) and how they in fact are (defining standards for truth). (63-64.)
 12. This is not meant to imply that these are the only problems. For example, Alston (1996) writes that what distinguishes epistemic justification from other forms of justification is that it "is valuable for the pursuit" of true beliefs and the avoidance of false beliefs (253). Without the distinction, "how can we do it?"
 13. As Alston (1996) writes:

The epistemic status of a belief varies over different epistemic situations. But truth value does not vary in this way. A belief (i.e., a belief content) is true or false once for all; it does not alter its truth value through time or across the population. p. 192,

Schlick (1979) too criticizes the pragmatist on this very point. He writes that truth for the pragmatist:

... is a variable thing. Thus, for many people over a long period the judgments of the Ptolemaic or Tyconic systems of the world were true; only now they are so no longer. Again, the judgment: 'Jupiter has only four satellites' was true from the time of Galileo until 1892, when it suddenly became false owing to the discovery of the fifth moon. Thus all truths subsist, so long as they verify themselves, and may one day be abolished by a new discovery. (64.)
 14. Schlick (1979) makes a similar observation:

...logic and science have at all times acknowledged that it is never truths, but only probabilities that admit of varying degrees. Anyone who so defines truth as not to conform to this postulate has not really defined the concept which has always been intended in science and life when speaking of truth, and which will also continued to be so intended in the future. (66.)
 15. Peirce (1955[1878]) makes a similar point when he writes concerning scientific research:

Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to

by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. (38.)

There is a connection between the claims made in this context to Wright's conception (1992) of "superassertability": "[A] statement is superassertable ... if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to, or other forms of improvement of our information" (48).

16. See Peirce (1955[1877]): "[T]he irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief" (10). Also see Peirce 1955[1878], 26-27; and 1955[1905], 257. Longino (1994) makes a similar point: "[J]ustificatory reasoning is part of a practice of challenge and response: challenge to a claim is met by the offering of reasons to believe it, which reasons can then be challenged ... provoking additional reasoning" (141).

17. Peirce (1955[1877]) makes a similar claim when discussing correct applications of the scientific method: "[T]he test of whether I am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to any of my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the application of the method" (20). A similar distinction occurs in Peirce 1955[1868]. There Peirce writes that were he really convinced by the formalism of the Cartesian criterion, "Which amounts to this: 'Whatever I am clearly conceived of, is true,'" then he "should have done with reasoning, and should require no test for certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious" (229).

18. As Fine (1984) suggests, there is "no projectable sketch ... of what truth signifies ..." (63). Schlick (1979) sees this as yet another reason for withholding the characterization of "truth" to what it is in which the pragmatist is interested (67).

19. James (1991) also characterizes absolute truth, "Truth with a big T", as a "regulative notion" (98-99).

20. The idealized notion of truth, "Truth with a Big T", is important. As Thomas McCarthy (1993) writes:

To dispense with the ideal in the name of the real is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Idealized notions of accountability, objectivity, and truth are pragmatic presuppositions of communicative interaction in everyday and scientific settings. They form the basis of our shared world and are the motor force behind expanding its horizons through learning, criticism, and self-criticism. (34.)

In this sense, "Truth with a Big T" does serve as a norm in inquiry, albeit a norm of a different kind than conditional truth. Also see Misak (1996), who argues that truth as a regulative notion is important because without the hope of ever reaching judgments that can always withstand the tests of rigorous and sustained inquiry "there would be no point in debate or investigation; giving up the assumption places an insurmountable obstacle in the way of inquiry" (215).

21. Peirce 1955[1878], 26-27, makes a similar point. Malcolm (1977) makes a similar observation when discussing the "groundlessness" of language games: "[W]ithin a system of thinking and acting there occurs, up to a point, investigation and criticism of the reasons and justifications that are employed in that system. This inquiry into whether a reason is good or adequate cannot ... go on endlessly. We stop it. We bring it to an end. We come upon something that satisfies us" (210).

22. That is to say, few if any of our beliefs may be immune from revision; few of our beliefs may be of such a sort that no further experience or reasoning would lead to our revising or giving up holding the beliefs.

23. As Levi (1985) notes, on a broadly Kuhnian picture, if the dispute between epistemic accounts "is settled by revolution, conversion, gestalt switch or, perhaps, some other psychological, social or political process ... [then] [T]he outcome is not the product of genuine inquiry in which pros and cons are weighed from a point of view which begs no questions under dispute" (4).

24. In effect, the mistake lies in supposing that the belief eliminates the irritation of doubt once for all, when in fact it does not do this. See Peirce 1955[1905], 256-57.
25. See Rescher 1980, 14; and Schlick 1979, 62-63, for different approaches to this question (though Schlick is not an advocate of either an epistemic or a pragmatist account of truth).

References Cited

- Alston, William P. 1989. Concepts of epistemic justification. In *Epistemic justification: Essays in the theory of knowledge*, 81-114. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 1996. *A realist conception of truth*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bonjour, Laurence. 1985. *The structure of empirical knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Cavell, Stanley. 1982. *The claim of reason*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chisholm, Roderick. 1977. *Theory of knowledge*, 2d edition. Foundations of Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- . 1982. *The foundations of knowing*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Clarke, Thompson. 1972. The legacy of skepticism. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 69, no. 20, 9 November: 754-69.
- Dewey, John. 1941. Propositions, warranted assertibility, and truth. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 38, no. 7, 27 March: 169-86.
- . 1991. *Middle works of John Dewey, 1899-1924*. Edited by Jo Ann Boydston, Vol. 12: *Reconstruction in philosophy and essays, 1920*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press.
- Elgin, Catherine Z. 1999. *Considered judgment*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Fine, Arthur. 1984. And not anti-realism either. *Nous*, 18, no. 1, March: 51-65.
- . 1998. The natural ontological attitude. In *Philosophy of science: The central issues*, edited by Martin Curd and J.A. Cover, 1186-208. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
- Goldman, Alvin. 1988. Strong and weak justification. In *Philosophical perspectives*, edited by James E. Tomberlin, Vol. 2: *Epistemology, 1988*, 51-69. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
- Harman, Gilbert. 1973. *Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- James, William. 1991. *Pragmatism*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- . 1997. *The meaning of truth*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Kirkham, Richard L. 1997. *Theories of truth: A critical introduction*. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.
- Kitcher, Philip. 1991. Socializing knowledge. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 88, no. 11, November: 675-76.
- Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1998. Why should inquiring minds want to know?: *Meno* problems and epistemological axiology. *The Monist*, 81, no. 3, July: 426-51.
- Levi, Isaac. 1985. Consensus as shared agreement and outcome of inquiry. *Synthese*, 62: 3-11.
- Longino, Helen E. 1994. The fate of knowledge in social theories of knowledge. In *Socializing epistemology: The social dimensions of knowledge*, edited by Frederick F. Schmitt, 135-57. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Lynch, Michael P. 1998. *Truth in context: An essay on pluralism and objectivity*. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.

